Fannie and Freddie are already subject to comprehensive regulation by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. If Congress is not satisfied with the current state of regulation, it should amend the relevant statutes rather than have regulators make the decision through an and non-transparent set of procedures.

The notion that morality (or ESG) can be scored on an objective scale is problematic. Not only do we do not share a common view of what is moral, but the intensity of ongoing political differences makes obvious the divergence in our views of what is moral; thus any "ESG" scale is inherently subjective (or, even worse, to use Commissioner Peirce's term, a measure of what is "trendy"). See .

It is not clear what incentive market participants would have to provide liquidity that will help to stabilize markets. Historically, market makers were compensated (arguably overcompensated) for serving in that role; thus the threat of losing the right to serve in that role could serve as an incentive to provide liquidity to a declining market. Regulations have generally removed the benefits of serving in a market maker role, so it is not obvious why any firm would or should put itself at…

This is a significant rulemaking that will require closer inspection. A Cadwalader memorandum will be posted shortly that will provide a more detailed analysis of the new rules.