The "do-no-harm" approach seems applicable to a great deal of financial regulation.

Until the CFTC adopts that approach, it will be burdened by heavily politicized rule proposals in search of nonexistent problems. For example, the CFTC would be wise to do no harm when regulating position limits on energy. Any cost-benefit analysis of that proposal likely would yield a very high price; common sense indicates that the power of sovereign nations to pump or withhold oil far outweighs…

The SEC's proposal contains a number of aspects that should give pause to derivatives market participants.

First, the SEC's use of the notional amounts of derivatives as a way to measure risk is inherently flawed. No one would accept the idea that investing $1,000 severally in U.S. government securities, junk bonds, S&P 100 stocks, gold and energy would entail comparable risks. The fact that a risk is taken with derivatives does not magically create parity. The risk originates…

The big, bad question for directors (and compliance officers) is this: Are you at risk for personal liability? Chair White cited the case of Commonwealth Capital Management (IC-31678) as an example of directors' negligence that warranted personal liability. Whether or not that case illustrates her point, directors should be mindful that their role now entails meaningful risks of personal liability if they are unable to document their oversight. Accordingly, directors also should keep records…

The GAO Report contains few, if any, surprises. A financial regulatory structure that proved incoherent even before Dodd-Frank has emerged from that legislation with more absurd complexities than before. To cite an example: the fact that five regulatory agencies are required to issue an interpretation of the Volcker Rule means that obtaining any uniform interpretation is nearly impossible. Another example: the overlap of the SEC and the CFTC in the regulation of swaps on securities –…