One way to assess Mr. Gensler's approach is to ask (i) what is the evidence that there is a lack of competition in the market for government securities; and (ii) why would increasing regulatory costs increase competition?

One might look to the effect of Dodd-Frank on the number of futures commission merchants. That number has continued to decline. See "" (July 1, 2015); "" (May 15, 2017); "" (January 10, 2022).

In short, increased regulation drives out a lot of market…

Had the securities and banking regulators allowed regulated broker-dealers and banks to provide custodial services, retail investors would not have been forced to custody through unregulated entities.

On many issues, it is not worthwhile for advisers to educate themselves on how to vote, and it is not a worthwhile expense for investors to bear. It is also questionable whether most investors are interested in how advisers vote, although interest groups certainly are. Thus, it makes sense to allow investment companies to adopt a policy whereby they may choose to make their votes public or not. Then, investors can decide by investing or redeeming whether they favor that particular policy.…

The combination of (i) a failure to develop a workable regulatory system for digital assets, (ii) ongoing regulatory criticisms of digital asset product failures (which result at least in part from the failure to develop a regulatory system) and (iii) the initiation of a CBDC pilot program serves to amplify a concern, , that the "administration may be seeking to clear the playing field of potential competitors (i.e., stablecoins) as it paves the way toward issuing a central bank digital…